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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

DONNA CURLING, et al.)
Plaintiff,)) CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.: 1:17-cv-) 2989-AT
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, et al.)
Defendant.	}

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF RHONDA J. MARTIN

RHONDA J. MARTIN declares, under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the following is true and correct:

- I have personal knowledge of all facts stated in this declaration and, if called to testify, I could and would testify competently thereto.
- 2. This declaration supplements my Declaration of March 10, 2020.
- 3. I am Executive Secretary for the Qatar Computing Research Institute Scientific Advisory Committee. I have developed avionics software for the Space Shuttle and worked with the Department of Defense to develop

guidance and policy for the testing of computer software for mission-critical applications. I have also taught AP Statistics and other Upper School level mathematics courses. I have an M.S. in Operations Research and a B.S. in Applied Mathematics from Georgia Institute of Technology, and Teaching Certification in Math Education

Major/Science Education Minor from Purdue University.

Logic and Accuracy Testing Procedures

4. On February 17, 2020, I witnessed Fulton County's Logic and Accuracy Testing at the Fulton County Elections Preparation Center, 1365 English Street, NW, Atlanta. At that time, I asked Blake Evans, Fulton County Elections Chief to send me a copy of the Logic and Accuracy Procedures. I attest that the attached document (Exhibit 1) is a true and correct copy of the procedures I received from Mr. Evans.

Fulton County Absentee Ballot Processing

- 5. On June 17, 2020, I visited the Fulton County Registration and Elections Department at 141 Pryor Street SW, Atlanta, to observe the processing of absentee mail ballots. Ralph Jones, Registration Chief of the Fulton County Registration and Elections Department, gave me a tour and explained the process being followed.
- 6. Ballots were being duplicated by hand if they were:

- · Rejected by the scanner for overvotes.
- Rejected by the scanner due to a printing problem (some ballots were printed choosing the "fit to page" option rather than using required margins).
- Not accepted by scanner for other reasons (e.g., damaged ballots).
- Ballots needing duplication were sorted by precinct and party to determine how many ballots of each ballot style needed duplication.
- Based on the criteria that I understand the scanner/tabulator used for rejection of ballots, I believe that several thousand ballots would have been hand-duplicated out of an estimated 173,000 absentee mail ballots cast.
- The blank ballots required for manual duplication were printed using Ballot on Demand Printers.
- 10. Then, one person duplicated the ballots and passed the originals and duplicates onto another person for verification. Once the second person verified that the duplication was done correctly, the original ballots were placed in a box and the duplicates were scanned.
- 11. No markings were made on the duplicates indicating that they were duplicates or allowing them to ever be associated with the corresponding originals again. No duplication logs were created.

Fulton County Post-Election Audit Process

- 12.On June 29, 2020, I attended the Pilot Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) conducted at the Fulton County Elections Preparation Center, 1365
 English Street, NW, Atlanta, by Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections Staff (including Blake Evans, Elections Chief, and Ralph Jones, Registration Chief) with assistance from the Secretary of State's Office (including Kevin Rayburn, Deputy Elections Director and Deputy General Counsel, and Gabriel Sterling, Chief Operating Officer) and Monica Childers, Project Manager, Risk Limiting Audits, of VotingWorks.
- 13. The pilot risk limiting ballot polling audit focused on the Fulton County

 Democratic Presidential Preference Primary ("PPP"). Mr. Rayburn stated
 that the Democratic PPP was selected for auditing "a long time ago"
 because "people care about this." Fulton County was selected because it
 would be "most illustrious of the process."
- 14.Mr. Rayburn also said that the process of this pilot audit was basically the same as the one held for the Cartersville municipal election in November 2019 although this was a more complicated election process with the PPP starting in March, then stopping and starting again in May for completion in June.

- 15. The pilot RLA sampled ballots from both the March and June portions of the election including outputs of ballot marking devices (BMDs) from inperson voting, absentee ballots marked by hand, and provisional ballots.
- 16.Hand-duplicated ballots were also included in the pool but were not labelled so there was no way to know if any were selected for the audit. It was also impossible to compare them to the corresponding originals since no duplication logs were created. This is concerning because the audit process requires working with the original source documents. There were a material number of such duplicates that had no audit trail. Another concern is that there is also no way to be sure that BMD printouts reflect voter intent because few voters seem to review their ballot cards for accuracy. When Dr. Richard DeMillo inquired about this, Mr. Rayburn replied "We know you have your views we are going to continue on here."
- 17. It should be noted that a large percentage of the cast ballots that formed the sampling population would not have included the Democratic PPP, the subject of the RLA. The Democratic PPP contest would not have been present if:
 - The ballot was a Republican or Non-partisan ballot.

 The ballot was cast in the June election by a voter that had also cast a ballot in the March PPP before it was suspended due to COVID.

In fact, just over 70% of the ballots cast contained votes for the Democratic PPP. Approximately 42,000 voters cast ballots either in person or using absentee ballots for the March PPP. Each of these voters were also eligible to vote again in June, though their June ballots would not have included the PPP contests from March. This phenomenon inflated the number of cast ballots, since individual voters could cast two ballots each.

18.It is also disturbing to note that the election results used for the audit do not match the "Official Results" for Fulton County found on the Georgia Secretary of State's website on 07.19.20 making it difficult for the public or press to even know the vote tallies for the election or have a sense of what underlying results were being used by this audit procedure.

FROM SOS WEBSITE on 07.17.20					USED FOR	USED FOR PILOT RLA	
(https://results.enr.clarityelections .com/GA/Fulton/103674/web.25423 2/#/summary?v=255464%2F)							
DEM - President of the United States	total votes	% of votes	over votes	under votes	total	% of votes	
Michael Bennet	488	0.3	45	1785	539	0.27%	
Joseph R. Biden	134,005	83.62	45	1785	161,577	81.72%	
Michael R. Bloomberg	1,021	0.64	45	1785	2,393	1.21%	
Pete Buttigieg	1,237	0.77	45	1785	1,393	0.70%	
John K. Delaney	126	0.08	45	1785	128	0.06%	
Tulsi Gabbard	501	0.31	45	1785	600	0.30%	
Amy Klobuchar	623	0.39	45	1785	732	0.37%	
Deval Patrick	139	0.09	45	1785	158	0.08%	
Bernie Sanders	16,308	10.18	45	1785	23,521	11.90%	
Tom Steyer	101	0.06	45	1785	122	0.06%	
Elizabeth Warren	4,229	2.64	45	1785	5,038	2.55%	
Andrew Yang	1,485	0.93	45	1785	1,524	0.77%	
Totals	160,263	100.01	45	1785	197,725	100%	
REP - President of the United States							
Donald J. Trump (I)	33,861	100	0	3271	38,042	100%	
GRAND TOTALS	194,124		45	5056	235,767		
TOTAL BALLOTS CAST					275,484		

- 19. The pilot RLA proceeded as follows. All participants were sworn in.

 There were 3 audit teams consisting of 2 people each. Ms. Monica

 Childers of VotingWorks presented a brief overview of Risk Limiting

 Audits. Twenty participants lined up to roll the 20 separate 10 sided

 dice to create a seed for the pseudo random number generator. It was

 02006722594941811068. A photo was taken and posted to Twitter.
- 20.Ms. Childers manually entered the election results (each candidate name and number of votes received in both the Democratic and

Republican PPP) into Arlo (VotingWorks RLA software). After she specified a risk level of 10% and supplied the ballot manifest, Arlo determined that 27 ballots were needed if there was to be a 90% chance of completing the RLA in 1 round. Arlo provided the list of 27 randomly selected Ballots indicating the Batch Name, Ballot Number, and Audit Board that should receive the ballot. Arlo also provided labels corresponding to each selected ballot. Each audit team was given a tally sheet where they would record the votes from the randomly selected ballots assigned to them and a sheet of labels listing their assigned ballots.

- 21. The naming convention used to identify the batches made it relatively easy to determine the type of the ballots that were selected:
 - 4 In Person Votes from the March Contest
 - 0 Absentee Ballots for the March Contest
 - 12 In Person Votes for the June Contest
 - 10 Absentee Ballots for the June Contest
 - 1 PR Ballot (provisional?)
- 22. For each ballot, the audit team went to the ballot custody control table to request the indicated batch of ballots. After signing out the batch, the team took the relevant container to their table and counted down to

- the selected ballot, removed it and replaced it with a brightly colored sheet of paper with a label attached specifying the batch name and ballot number. A similar label was applied to the ballot.
- 23.Each audit team was instructed to mark exactly what they saw on the ballot for the selected PPP race on their tally sheet including overvotes (of course, there shouldn't have been any of these since overvoted ballots were hand-duplicated so that they would be accepted by the scanners). The ballot was then placed on the top of the batch in its container and the container was returned to the ballot custody control table where it was signed back in.
- 24. According to Ms. Childers, had they encountered any hand-duplicated ballots, the audit teams were to request that the corresponding original ballots be located and provided for examination and tallying. Ms.
 Childers was incredulous when told that hand-duplicated ballots were not labelled, thereby making the process of locating the original source documents impossible.
- 25.During a meeting with Mr. Jones on August 17, 2020, I asked about plans to label hand-duplicated ballots in future elections so that original source documents could be located and used during future RLA processes. He said they have no plans to modify current

processes to mark such ballots as duplicates. I explained that such a practice fails to create an essential audit trail, but was unable to convince Mr. Jones of the crucial nature of an audit trail to verify that the duplicated ballots match the original ballots reflecting voter intent.

26. After all of the ballots specified by Arlo had been retrieved, their results recorded on the tally sheets, and the ballot containers returned to custody, the tally sheets were turned in to Ms. Childers who entered the results into Arlo:

16 votes for Biden

1 vote for Sanders

6 blanks

4 votes for Trump

27.Of the 27 randomly selected ballots, only 17 contained votes for the Democratic PPP, though the 6 blanks were listed as Democratic Ballots on the audit report. The blanks were all cast in the June election either in person or absentee (the timing for the PR ballot is unknown), so it is conceivable that those voters had already voted in the PPP in March. Or, they chose not to vote in the Democratic PPP possibly because Biden was the only candidate still in the race.

- 28. The audit report did not differentiate between instances where the PPP contest was left blank by the voter or where the race did not appear on the June ballot. The tally sheets did have separate rows for "no vote cast" and "no PPP on the ballot", but Arlo only provided one option for recording these instances for the Democratic contest and one option for the Republican contest: Overvote/Blank Vote/Not on Ballot.
- 29.Observers were not able to see the individual ballots to compare them with the markings on the tally sheets and therefore had to trust the information on the tally sheets and that it was properly entered into Arlo.
- 30. After a bit of a delay, Ms. Childers announced that Arlo had decreed that 1 round was sufficient to complete the RLA since the calculated p-value of .05% was less than the specified risk limit of 10%, and the outcome of the Democratic PPP in Fulton County was validated.
- 31.I am concerned about the proclamation by the Secretary of State that this pilot RLA confirmed the outcome of the PPP for a number of reasons. First of all, trusted source documents were not used as the basis for the audit. Secondly, I am unsure as to whether the Arlo software was designed to handle an election as complex as this one.

 Blindly applying a software-based auditing tool when the basic

assumptions of the underlying statistics are violated does not bolster my confidence in the state of Georgia's conduct of elections or their ability to employ RLAs in a trustworthy manner.

Ballot Adjudication and Software Vote Counting

- 32.On August 14, 2020, I visited the Fulton County Elections Preparation Center, 1365 English Street, NW, Atlanta, to observe the adjudication of absentee ballots from the August 11, 2020 Runoff Election under the supervision of Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections Staff, Ralph Jones, Registration Chief.
- 33. Exhibit 2, pages 1-13, are screen shots of the activities in the adjudication process taken by Coalition representatives Samantha Whitley and myself during the Vote Review Panel meetings on August 14, 2020 and August 17, 2020. I attest that they are true and correct images of what was displayed on the screen during the adjudication process.
- 34. It is my understanding that there had been previous adjudication sessions, but Fulton County neglected to provide notice so that I could attend and observe.
- 35. After a delay while the Dominion technology support person struggled to get the system set up for adjudication, Mr. Jones briefly trained the

- Vote Review Panel members on how to operate the ImageCast adjudication software. There were two screens set up so that two Vote Review Panels could operate simultaneously.
- 36. Votes which had been determined by the Dominion software to be overvotes or ambiguous marks were flagged for on screen review and adjudication by the Vote Review Panel. This adjudication process took place completely on screen where the vote counting decisions were made based on a low resolution black and white image, without looking at the original paper ballot. See Exhibit 2, page 11.
- 37. As the Vote Review Panels got to work processing the ballots that had been flagged for adjudication, it was very difficult to observe their activities in a meaningful way. The Vote Review Panels quickly clicked here and there and switched from one view to another as they examined the ballot images, without making a record of who approved each vote change or why the decision was made. At times, they appeared to almost forget to confer and confirm that they agreed on the interpretation of the vote; the most important part of the process was an afterthought as attention was focused on operating the adjudication software.

- 38. The Vote Review Panel was literally changing how the votes being examined were tallied on the server without a paper audit trail or a verifiable record of how and why the votes were being changed. See Exhibit 2, page 12. Although electronic adjudication logs were presumably being kept of the changes, there was no attempt to review, verify or sign the logs, making any system logs of limited value in performing an audit or establishing proper controls. I am aware of nothing in the State's instructions or training for the Vote Review Panels that requires a verifiable audit trail for these changes to the vote count.
- 39. The first Vote Review Panel paused when presented with a blank ballot (no vote marks at all appearing on the black and white image) to ask Mr. Jones what to do. See Exhibit 2, page 13. After waiting for a while for him to finish up with the second Vote Review Panel, the first Vote Review Panel decided to accept the blank ballot as-is so they could continue adjudicating other ballots. There was no request to see the original paper ballot to ensure that it was, in fact, blank.
- 40.Of the ten ballots that I observed being adjudicated, three appeared to be blank (to have no votes marked at all on the ballot). At no time, did anyone ask to see the corresponding original paper ballots to determine

- whether the scanner was failing to detect or record votes perhaps because of the ink color.
- 41. While not impossible, it seems odd that a voter would go to the trouble to return a ballot with no vote marks at all.
- 42. During the August 10, 2020, State Election Board Meeting, Rule 183-1-15-.02(2) Definition of Vote was adopted for public comment. A portion of this proposed rule specifies scanner settings as follows: (k) Ballot scanners that are used to tabulate optical scan ballots marked by hand shall be set so that: 1. Detection of 20% or more fill-in of the target area surrounded by the oval shall be considered a vote for the selection; 2. Detection of less than 10% fill-in of the target area surrounded by the oval shall not be considered a vote for that selection; 3. Detection of at least 10% but less than 20% fill-in of the target area surrounded by the oval shall flag the ballot for adjudication by a vote review panel as set forth in O.C.G.A. 21-2-483(g). In reviewing any ballot flagged for adjudication, the votes shall be counted if, in the opinion of the vote review panel, the voter has clearly and without question indicated the candidate or candidates and answers to questions for which such voter desires to vote. Part (e) of the rule states: If, in reviewing an optical scan ballot marked by hand, a

discrepancy is found between the voter's mark on the ballot that clearly and without question indicated the voter's intent and the result tabulated by the ballot scanner, the voter's mark shall control and be counted. Nothing herein shall be deemed to disallow the use of ballot scanners for tabulation of ballots.

43.I participated remotely in the State Election Board Meeting on August 10, 2020, and listened to the discussion of scanner settings. Based on my personal observation of the Fulton Vote Review Panels' adjudication process and information displayed on computer screens from which they made vote counting decisions, I am concerned that the State Election Board is making decisions without adequately testing the scanners to be sure the settings are appropriate to detect voter intent and count all votes; more specifically, how do they know that less than 10% fill in absolutely corresponds to no vote being present? If the scanner settings are not sensitive enough to flag a ballot for adjudication when voter marks are present, the Vote Review Panels will never be given the opportunity to determine whether voter intent is, in fact, being reflected in the tabulation. Based on my observation of the Fulton process, I am also concerned that the State Board has no rule that requires full paper audit trail documentation and

- reconciliation of votes accepted and rejected by the Vote Review Panel and the impact of their decisions on the final vote tallies.
- 44. Not long after the adjudication process began, an error message appeared on the screen being used by the first Vote Review Panel indicating a problem with loading the next ballot for adjudication. Mr. Jones glanced at the message and said that meant that more ballots needed to be loaded. Soon thereafter, the second Vote Review Panel encountered a similar message.
- 45. After a short delay while Mr. Jones and the Dominion technology support person struggled to load more ballots, Mr. Jones declared that there were no more ballots to adjudicate and the exercise was complete. There was no ballot accounting performed to attempt to verify the number of ballots the system flagged for adjudication against the number of ballots processed by the Vote Review Panels.
- 46. At this point, the Vote Review Panel members were asked to provide identification so that they could be paid. I was surprised that at no time did I see anyone administer or swear an oath concerning the adjudication of absentee ballots.
- 47.On August 17, 2020, I returned to the Fulton County Elections

 Preparation Center, 1365 English Street, NW, Atlanta, to observe the

- adjudication of provisional ballots under the supervision of Fulton
 County Board of Registration and Elections Staff, Ralph Jones,
 Registration Chief.
- 48. An error message appeared on the screen prior to loading any ballots for adjudication. This time, Mr. Jones sat down and read the error message and the additional information screens.
- 49. After some time was spent with Mr. Jones and the Dominion technology support person struggling to load provisional ballots for adjudication, Mr. Jones declared that there were no provisional ballots to adjudicate.
- 50.I have a number of concerns about the adjudication process as it is conducted by Fulton County Board of Registrations and Elections

 Staff. At no time did I see the Vote Review Panels look at the second page of the ballot image to see the AuditMark Vote Cast Record so that they could be sure the adjudication software was performing as they intended. Secondly, I did not see anyone ask to see any of the original paper ballots, not even those that appeared to be blank, although the images are low quality images that may easily fail to reflect marginal marks, or marks made with certain non-black inks.

 Total trust was placed in the low quality images produced by the

scanners. I came away from my observation time feeling that I had just witnessed an extremely error prone and chaotic process with few controls to assure that votes were recorded as intended, that all ballots needing human attention were actually reviewed, and that adjudication changes were thorough and auditable.

Executed on this date, August 23, 2020.

Rhonda J. Martin

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Logic and Accuracy Procedures

Version 1.0 Georgia Secretary of State – Brad Raffensperger © January 2020

> EXHIBIT 1



Logic and Accuracy Procedures

Items needed when testing:

From EMS workstation computer create the following items from the Election Project associated to the election for which testing is being conducted:

- Use Election Event Designer Application (EED) for the following:
 - Programmed Technician Card
 - *Programmed Poll Worker Card*
 - o USB Drive containing information from GA ICX BMD programming group
 - *Print out of Ballot Activation Codes*
 - *Programmed Compact Flash Cards for Polling Place Scanner*
 - *Programmed Security Key Tab for Polling Place Scanner*
 - Recommendation: Create the * items above for each polling location and then use these to L&A test the equipment designated for the same polling place; at completion of L&A test on designated equipment package these items with the tested equipment for delivery to the designated polling place
- Provided by SOS after Election Project Obtained
 - o Election Project User names and Passcodes
 - o Technician Card Passcode
 - Poll Worker Card Passcode
 - Security Key Tab Passcode
 - o Polling Place Scanner Re-zero Passcode
 - Poll Pad User name and Passcode
 - o Poll Pad Menu Code

Testing Steps:

A. Preparing the BMDs

- Connect BMD to Printer
- Connect BMD and Printer to power supply
- First, Power Printer On
- Power the BMD On
- Verify installed version in top left corner of screen
- Confirm presence of State Acceptance Test Sticker and seal on top left of BMD
- Insert Technician Card and enter passcode for specific election
- Verify date and time are properly set
 - o If time or date needs to be adjusted, touch Modify and set the time and date
 - If time and date are correct, touch Confirm



- Touch Clear All Election Data
- Touch Yes
- Enter passcode
- Touch OK
- Insert USB Drive into an available USB slot in the Election Data compartment of the BMD
- Touch Load Election Data
- Select the data file to be loaded from the USB Drive
 - Touch Select
 - o Touch Copy
 - o Touch Ok
- · Remove the USB Drive from the Election Data compartment of the BMD
- Close the Election Data compartment and attach seal, notate the number of the attached seal on paperwork
- Remove Technician Card
- Insert Poll Worker Card and passcode for specific election
- Touch Select Tabulator
- Select the BMD for the Polling location to which this BMD is being assigned
- Touch OK
- Touch Manual Selection Activation and confirm a checkmark appears in the box
- Touch AVS Controller and confirm a checkmark appears in the box
- Touch Open Polls
- Touch Yes
 - o If Warning displayed regarding printer, confirm the Printer is connected and On
 - o Touch OK
 - o Touch Open Polls
 - Touch Yes
- Name of Polling Place BMD is assigned will display in Black on the top left of BMD Screen; confirm correct Polling Place shown
- Name of Election will display in Gray on the top left of BMD Screen; confirm correct Election shown
- Remove the Poll Worker Card
- Confirm Total Ballots Printed in bottom left corner shows zero (0)
- BMD is now ready

B. Preparing the Polling Place Scanner

- Insert the Primary Compact Flash Card into the Poll Worker Slot
- Insert the Backup Compact Flash Card into the Administrator Slot
- Confirm the Polling Place Scanner connected properly to the Ballot Box
- Confirm presence of State Acceptance Test Sticker on right side of scanner
- Power the Polling Place Scanner ON by plugging the Ballot Box into an AC power supply



- When the Polling Place Scanner begins to beep, beep, beep; align and carefully press down the Security Key Tab to the Security Key Slot
- · When prompted on the screen, key in the passcode for the specific election, then press Enter
- · Confirm Date and Time, modify the date and time if necessary
- Touch Utilities
- Touch Diagnostics
 - Touch Simple
 - o Touch Yes after Thermal Printer test
 - o Touch Print
 - o Touch No
 - o Review printed tape, confirm software version
 - o If any item in the Diagnostic test fails, do not proceed
- Touch Open Poll
 - Enter passcode for specific election, if prompted
- Touch Zero
 - Confirm tape shows zero results for all candidates in all races
 - o If results are not zero, do not proceed
- Touch No for additional copies
- Confirm Polling Place Scanner shows zero (0) ballots cast
- · Polling Place Scanner is now ready to accept ballots

C. Preparing Poll Pads for BMD LA Testing

- Notification of the LA/Advance Voting data set for Poll Pad along with a QR Code image for scanning by Poll Pad will be forwarded to those locations with a scheduled election
- Reference Poll Pad training documents and materials for assistance if the following steps need further explanation
- Power on Poll Pads to be used for LA/Advance Voting; this will not be ALL Poll Pads but only specific Poll Pads
- Connect designated Poll Pads to the appropriate connection
- Launch the Poll Pad application and scan the QR code image; follow prompts displayed on Poll Pad to obtain the Poll Pad LA/Acceptance Data set for the scheduled election
- Once download of the data file is complete, close the Poll Pad application
- Disconnect the Poll Pad from the appropriate connection
- · Launch the Poll Pad application again
- Touch Get Started
- Enter User name and Passcode for specific election
- Touch Manual Entry
- Key in the Precinct Name or Precinct ID into the Last Name field
- Touch Search
- Touch the Precinct and Combo record desired and follow the prompts to create a voter card



- Create a voter card from Poll Pad for each unique ballot style within the designated Polling Location
 - Recommend labels be placed on card identifying what ballot style will be displayed by BMD once card is inserted
 - BMD removes the activation code from the Voter Card once used, therefore create the card again from Poll Pad after each use by a BMD

D. Testing the BMD and Printer

Use a combination of Poll Worker Card with Ballot Activation Codes for the polling location, and Voter Cards created from a Poll Pad loaded with the LA/Advance Voting dataset to bring up ballots on the BMD

- Produce at least one printed ballot from each BMD assigned to the polling location
- Produce a test deck from the BMDs assigned to the polling location for each unique ballot style
 within the polling location. The test deck must contain at least one vote for each candidate
 listed in each race within the unique ballot style
 - <u>Example</u>: Ballot from BMD 1 contains a vote for only the first candidate in each race listed on Ballot Style 1, Ballot from BMD 2 contains a vote only for the second candidate in each race on Ballot Style 1, and continue through the line of devices until all candidates in all races within the unique ballot style have received a single vote
 - If Number of BMDs outnumber the number of vote positions on the unique ballot style, start the vote pattern over until all BMDs have produced one printed ballot
 - If Number of unique ballot styles in the polling place is greater than 1, once the vote pattern is complete for a unique ballot style, proceed to the next BMD in line to start the review of the next unique Ballot Style
 - o All unique ballot styles do not have to be tested on each BMD
- Review BMD-generated Test Deck and confirm the vote content before placing in the designated Polling Place Scanner

E. Testing the Polling Place Scanner

- Scan the BMD-generated Test Deck into the Polling Place Scanner
- Scan one blank optical scan ballot style(s) associated to the Polling Place to verify the Polling Place Scanner will recognize the ballot style in case of emergency
- Verify Scanner(s) shows a number of Ballot Cast equal to the number of ballots in the BMDgenerated test deck plus the scanned blank Optical Scan ballot styles
- Firmly place the Security Key Tab in the Security Key Slot
- Touch Close Polls
- Enter the passcode
- Touch Enter
- Touch Yes
- Touch No for additional tapes (Scanner will automatically produce 3 copies of the closing tape)



- Review the results tape and confirm result printed matches the known vote content of the BMD-generated and Optical Scan ballot test deck
 - o If results do not match, the scanner has failed, do not proceed
- Touch Power Down
- Touch Yes
- Unplug the Ballot Box from the AC power supply
- When the unit is OFF, open the Poll Worker card slot door and remove the Poll Worker Compact Flash Card
- The Poll Worker Compact Flash card for each Polling Place Scanner <u>MUST</u> be uploaded to the RTR application to confirm the Compact Flash card can be recognized and results transferred to the EMS for tabulation; then validate and publish the uploaded result file
- After the Compact Flash Card is uploaded to RTR, return the Compact Flash card to its designated Polling Place Scanner and re-insert it into the Poll Worker card slot

F. Preparing the BMD for Election

- Insert the Poll Worker Card and enter passcode
- Touch Admin Menu
- Touch Close Polls
- Touch Yes to confirm
- Touch Reset
- Touch Yes to confirm
- Enter Passcode for specific election
- Touch Ok to confirm
- Confirm Public Counter is at Zero (0); center of BMD screen
- · Touch Power off, bottom right corner of screen
- Touch Yes to confirm
- Remove Poll Worker Card
- Turn Printer Off
- Disconnect the Power and Printer from BMD
- Close and seal the Power and Election Data compartments on the right side of the BMD
 - Make note of the seals attached
- Make the BMDs and Printers ready for delivery to the Polling Place

G. Preparing the Polling Place Scanner for Election

- Confirm that both the Poll Worker and Administrator Compact Flash cards are inserted into their assigned slots
- Power the Polling Place Scanner ON by plugging the Ballot Box into an AC power supply
- When the Polling Place Scanner begins to beep, beep, beep; align and carefully press down the Security Key Tab to the Security Key Slot



- When prompted on the screen, key in the needed passcode, then press Enter
- Confirm Date and Time, modify the date and time if necessary
- Touch Utilities
- Touch Re-Zero
- Enter Re-Zero passcode
- Confirm Ballot Cast shows as Zero (0)
- Touch Utilities
- Touch Report
- Touch Election Report
- Touch Zero
- Enter Number of Reports to print = 1
- Touch Enter
- · Touch No for additional copies
- Confirm tape shows zero results for all candidates in all races
- · Remove the tape and place with L&A Paperwork
- Touch Power Down
- Touch Yes
- Unplug Ballot Box from AC power supply
- Open Ballot Box and remove all test ballots from the Main bin, from the Write-In bin, and from the emergency bin
- Confirm that all bins are empty and properly secured
- · Close and seal the ballot box, make note of the seals applied
- Place seals on the Poll Worker and Administrator Compact Flash Card doors, make note of the seals applied
- Make Ballot Box with attached Polling Place Scanner ready for delivery to the Polling Place

H. Testing ICC Workstation and Central Scanner

- Load ICC ABS tabulator Data Set to ICC workstation computer DVS folder
- Launch ICC Application
- Import Tabulator
- Attach Security Key Tab; Enter Passcode
- Enter Name of Project equal to name of ICC ABS tabulator
- Click Load
- Click Configuration
- · Set secondary results path
- Verify Scanner is On and recognized by the ICC application
- Click Scan Options
- Set Ballot configuration to Dynamic
- Set scanner to Stop on Overvotes for ALL races



- Set Scanner Continuity to Continuous Scan
- Click OK
- Click Scanning
- Click YES
- Insert Test Deck with known result
- Click Scan
- · Verify Scanner recognizes and scans all ballots within the test deck
- · Verify Scanner recognizes any error ballots that may be included within the test deck
- · Verify Scanner recognizes any overvotes
- Accept the Batch
- Close the ICC application
- Remove ICC ABS tabulator Data Set from ICC workstation computer DVS folder
- Open RTR Application on EMS Workstation
- Open election project
- Load Results from ICC via Secondary path established on ICC workstation
- Click Load
- Click Election Summary Report and generate Election Summary Report prior to validating and publish result file from ICC
- Click Result Files
- Click Search
- Select ICC ABS result file
- · Click Validate and Publish
- Click Election Summary Report and generate Election Summary Report
- Verify Results shown for ABS match the known result of the Test Deck scanned by the ICC

I. Upload LA results to ENR

- After results have been loaded to RTR from the Polling Place and ICC scanners
- Create folder on the Desktop of EMS computer labeled State Export
- · Open RTR, click Export
- Click Export Type
- Click Search
- Verify that ONLY the GA Export File type is active (contains a checkmark)
- · In tool bar, click Settings>Transfer Points
- Click Add
- Click Browse; Select the folder on the Desktop labeled State Export
- In Connection Name type State Export
- Click OK
- Click Save
- · Below Tool Bar, Click Start Results Export



- Minimize RTR
- Open State Export folder on Desktop
- Confirm Export file present in State Export folder
- Extract export file and upload to State ENR
- Open EED
- Create folder to Desktop labeled "Name of Election-Backups"
- Create a Backup copy of the Election Project
- Copy the saved Backup zip file and accompanying SHA file and place in Backups folder; copy the folder containing the backups to removable media
- Clear results from RTR
- Print new Election Summary Report from RTR confirming all LA results have been cleared
- Close RTR and EED on EMS workstation

J. Loading Election Day Dataset to Poll Pad

- Approximately one week prior to the scheduled Election Day, notification of Election Day data files for Poll Pad along with a QR Code image for scanning by Poll Pad will be forwarded to those locations with a scheduled election
- · Power on Poll Pad
- Connect Poll Pads scheduled for use on Election Day to the appropriate connection
- Launch the Poll Pad application and scan the QR code image; follow prompts displayed on Poll Pad to obtain the Poll Pad Election Day Data set for the scheduled election
- Once download of the data file is complete, close the Poll Pad application
- Disconnect the Poll Pad from the appropriate connection
- Launch the Poll Pad application again
- Touch Get Started
- Enter the User name and Passcode for the specific election
- Confirm the proper Election and Polling Location are shown at the top of the screen
- Confirm the number of Precinct Records (voters assigned to location) is accurate
- Confirm Check-Ins are Zero (0)
- Connect Voter Card Encoder to Poll Pad and confirm encoder is recognized by Poll Pad (green indicator at top right of screen)
- Connect power cord to Voter Card Encoder and verify power flows through Voter Card Encoder and charges the Poll Pad
- Touch Scan Barcode
- · Confirm camera is operational
- Touch Cancel
- Touch Manual Entry
- Key in last name of known voter in polling place
- Touch Search



- · Touch selected voter record, confirm voter information shown is accurate
- Touch Accept
- · Confirm Voter Certificate is displayed with signature line
- · Put in example signature
- · Touch Done Signing
- · Confirm Poll Officer Initial box is operational
- Touch Submit
- Touch Touchscreen
- Insert Voter Card into Voter Card Encoder
- Verify Ballot Style and Ballot Activation Code display at bottom of screen
- Confirm Create Card button at top of screen becomes active
- Touch Create Card to verify Voter Card can be created
- Touch Manual Entry
- Find previous Voter
- · Touch Wheel and Enter password; confirm password for specific election recognized
- · Cancel Voter Check-in
- Spoil Ballot
- · Verify mark has been removed
- · Press iPad Home button to Close Poll Pad Application

K. Loading Update File to Poll Pad

- On the Saturday prior to the scheduled Election Day, notification of Election Day update data files for Poll Pad will be forwarded to those locations with a scheduled election
- Power on Poll Pad
- Connect Poll Pads scheduled for use on Election Day to the appropriate connection
- Launch the Poll Pad application and follow prompts displayed on Poll Pad to obtain the Poll Pad Election Day Data set for the scheduled election
- Once download of the data file is complete, close the Poll Pad application
- Disconnect the Poll Pad from the appropriate connection
- Launch the Poll Pad application again
- Touch Get Started
- Enter User name and Passcode for the specific election
- Confirm the proper Election and Polling Location are shown at the top of the screen
- · Confirm the number of Precinct Records (voters assigned to location) is accurate
- Confirm Check-Ins are Zero (0)
- Connect Voter Card Encoder to Poll Pad and confirm encoder is recognized by Poll Pad (green indicator at top right of screen)
- Connect power cord to Voter Card Encoder and verify power flows through Voter Card Encoder and charges the Poll Pad



- Touch Menu
- Touch Summary Report
- · Touch Absentees; confirm expected number of Absentee Voters for polling location
- Touch Home
- · Touch Get Started
- Touch Scan Barcode
- · Confirm camera is operational
- Touch Cancel
- Touch Manual Entry
- · Key in last name of known voter in polling place
- Touch Search
- Touch selected voter record, confirm voter information shown is accurate
- Touch Accept
- Confirm Voter Certificate is displayed with signature line
- Put in example signature
- Touch Done Signing
- Confirm Poll Officer Initial box is operational
- Touch Submit
- Touch Touchscreen
- Insert Voter Card into Voter Card Encoder
- Verify Ballot Style and Ballot Activation Code display at bottom of screen
- · Confirm Create Card button at top of screen becomes active
- · Touch Create Card to verify Voter Card can be created
- Touch Manual Entry
- Find previous Voter
- Touch Wheel and Enter password; confirm password for specific election recognized
- Cancel Voter Check-in
- Spoil Ballot
- Verify mark has been removed
- · Press iPad Home button to Close Poll Pad Application
- Power Poll Pad off
- Place Poll Pad along with Voter Card Encoder, stand, charging cord and AC plug into case
- Close Case and Seal; notate seal on paperwork







EXHIBIT 2









Ballot 15 in

Batch 715 - 6

View Audit N



